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"Do you want to make a lot of money or do you want to work for justice? Do you want to run marathons or sing in a choir? Do you want to have children or travel the world? The things we care about in life - families, friendships, jobs, health, moral ideals, hobbies - tend to conflict with each other. Unresolvable conflicts make our lives worse, because they prevent us from doing what matters to us. Worse still, we don't always know what we really want, or how to define success. How can you resolve a problem you've barely identified? This is a book about how to live your own life well by identifying your values and resolving conflicts among your goals and between your goals and the world. It is a philosophical guide, rather than a self-help book. There are no top ten lists for how to be happy or get rich quick, and no proclamations about what you should care about. Instead, philosopher Valerie Tiberius aims to provide readers a way of thinking about our goals that enables us to reflect on them in an effective way throughout our lives. This way of thinking is illustrated with examples that range from the silly to the serious, from shopping to navigating sexism. We'll also see that even if no one else can decide for us what matters in life, the other people in our lives have a profound influence on our goals and how we should pursue them. The best kind of reflection acknowledges the importance of our interconnectedness"--

This was the first philosophy textbook in moral psychology, introducing students to a range of philosophical topics and debates. This new edition includes a chapter on the question of whether morality is innate or learned. The bulleted summaries, study questions, and lists for further readings have been updated

This is the first philosophy textbook in moral psychology, introducing students to a range of philosophical topics and debates such as: What is moral motivation? Do reasons for action always depend on desires? Is emotion or reason at the heart of moral judgment? Under what conditions are people morally responsible? Are there self-interested reasons for people to be moral? Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction presents research by philosophers and psychologists on these topics, and addresses the overarching question of how empirical research is (or is not) relevant to philosop.

How should you live? Should you devote yourself to perfecting a single talent or try to live a balanced life? Should you lighten up and have more fun, or buckle down and try to achieve greatness? Should you try to be a better friend? Should you be self-critical or self-accepting? And how should you decide among the possibilities open to you? Should you consult experts, listen to your parents, do lots of research? Make lists of pros and cons, or go with your gut? These are notquestions that can be answered in general or in the abstract. Rather, these questions are addressed to the first person

This paper examines the normative principles that should guide policies aimed at promoting happiness or, more broadly, well-being. After arguing that well-being policy is both legitimate and necessary, we lay out a case for pragmatic subjectivism: given widely accepted principles of respect for persons, well-being policy may not assume any view of well-being, subjectivist or objectivist. Rather it should promote what its intended beneficiaries see as good for them: pleasure for hedonists, excellence for Aristotelians, etc. Specifically, well-being policy should promote citizens' personal welfare values: those values - and not mere preferences - that individuals' see as bearing on their well-being. We suggest a variety of means for determining what people value, but conclude that there is no canonical means of doing this: there will often be some indeterminacy about what people value. Finally, we consider how pragmatic subjectivism works in practice, arguing that headline measures of well-being should include subjective well-being - given that it is so widely and deeply valued - and perhaps other values as well.

The lack of gender parity in philosophy has garnered serious attention recently. Previous empirical work that aims to quantify what has come to be called "the gender gap" in philosophy focuses mainly on the absence of women in philosophy faculty and graduate programs. Our study looks at gender representation in philosophy among undergraduate students, undergraduate majors, graduate students, and faculty. Our findings are consistent with what other studies have found about women faculty in philosophy, but we were able to add two pieces of new information. First, the biggest drop in the proportion of women in philosophy occurs between students enrolled in introductory philosophy classes and philosophy majors. Second, this drop is mitigated by the presence of more women philosophy faculty.